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The Philosopher’s Stone: AI Discrimination in Recruitment Can Turn Claims into Gold, If You
Can Find It
Early 20th century American history is defined by the mechanization that transformed
human life more in a span of decades than all of the previous millennia. 1 Driven by technology,
this rapid change is appropriately called the Industrial Revolution. 2 From the steam engines that
connected the ends of our country together, to the light bulb that quickly found its way into
almost every home and every street, human life was redefined in a matter of decades. Today’s
technology far surpasses that of the Industrial Revolution and continues to progress at an
exponential rate as we enter a new technological era of our own. 3 The gap between world
changing technological developments shrinks with every milestone as we computerize our lives. 4
This new revolution is defining the 21st century the way the Industrial Revolution
defined the 20th, and the key to understanding the future comes with understanding artificial
intelligence, or AI for short.5 The steam engine of the digital age, AI dominates an everincreasing portion of our lives, and by extension the legal field. 6 Advanced search engines in our
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beloved Westlaw and Lexis databases, personal assistants in our phones like Siri, and countless
other examples show how AI has revolutionized an attorney’s job.
AI has also revolutionized the very process of getting a job. ZipRecruiter, one of many
job board and social networks that specialize in advertising employment opportunities, has 25
million monthly active users and, as of March 11th, 2021, 9 million job postings.7 ZipRecruiter
and its competitors are more than just digital job boards, they offer sophisticated programs that
help employers find the best fit for their vacancies. Job boards like LinkedIn utilize AI that learn
primarily from employer input; the advertising employer reviews applicants brought through the
service and rates their eligibility.8 The AI then learns from those ratings and uses that
information to find new applicants that fit the trend of high-rated applicants. 9 Although most
applicant-focused AI work the same on a fundamental level, the inner workings of these
machines are jealously guarded by a combination of legal protections and trade secrecy. 10
In 2014 Amazon created its own recruitment AI in an effort to cut out the middleman and
potentially even branch into the employment market themselves. 11 Amazon, like many other
giants in the digital age, was looking for the “holy grail” of recruitment; a program that would
not only filter out bad candidates but put the perfect fits at the top. 12 Ideally, this program would
replace the time-consuming and resource-intensive interview process that defines the modern
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understanding of employment.13 But in 2015 Amazon discovered a flaw with the potential to
create a legal nightmare.14 Amazon’s AI had decided that because most successful software
developers and technical employees were men, the best candidates are men. 15 The AI penalized
resumes for any mention of the word “women’s” and downgraded the value of degrees from allwomen’s colleges.16 Amazon edited the programs to no longer make decisions based on sex, but
still scrapped the project a year later.17
Amazon narrowly avoided an incident by scrapping the secret project before any damage
was done. Amazon is a company often on the cutting edge of technology, but they are but one of
a number of tech giants.18 Google and Facebook are fierce competitors in the field, and it is not
uncommon for all three to be working on the same goal with their own respective projects. This
is not to mention companies of equal size such as Wal-Mart who have just as much interest in a
computer program that could supplement if not replace their expansive HR departments. This
gives ample justification to ask if Amazon is not the only incident of AI discrimination to have
happened, but rather the only one to have been caught.
It is possible, even probable, that AI out in the market today that suffer from the same
flaws as Amazon’s AI.19 It would be a clear-cut case of systemic disparate treatment, or
intentional discrimination, if a human did what Amazon’s AI did. The theory of disparate
treatment has evolved through court precedent and legislative amendments to encompass
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employers and their direct subordinates, but it is unclear if it applies to AI. 20 AI in general has
little to no meaningful legislation, AI in the workplace included. One of the few attempts at
legislating this growing field comes out of Illinois that does little more than require employers
give notice to job applicants they are being monitored by AI during interviews. 21 Another
attempt at AI legislation is the Algorithmic Accountability Act, which was introduced to the
House and Senate floors in 2019.22 Originally introduced in response to a law suit by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development against Facebook for discriminating against
protected classes for housing advertisements, the bill would be a step towards addressing AI in a
similar vein as employment discrimination. 23 The bill falls short of properly addressing the
growing concerns, as it would at best only regulate automated decision making, and would do
nothing for potential plaintiffs should any discrimination occur regardless. 24
Until legislators catch up to the rate of technological growth, lawyers and courts alike
must work within existing framework to adapt to an evolving world. Given the current state of
employment law and political climate regarding AI, employers should be wary when using such
tools in recruitment efforts. An employer using an AI that discriminates against protected classes
under Title VII and ADEA can find themselves liable under either the theories of disparate
impact or disparate treatment. Drawing on product defect and manufacturer liability, a new cause
of action can arise allowing plaintiffs to sue the developers of a discriminating AI when the AI
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creates its own discriminatory biases. Although Congressional amendments to labor law will be
needed before long, courts can work within existing framework to ensure justice for plaintiffs.
The legal frameworks for employment discrimination predate recruitment AI, but they
still establish the foundation for legal claims. 25 Proving these claims is challenging, as with any
discrimination case. Evidentiary hurdles native to discrimination claims apply to these new
issues just as much as traditional discrimination actions.26 The promise of a line of code
revealing an AI is discriminating based on protected status, a philosopher’s stone that can turn a
claim to gold, may entice plaintiff-serving employment firms to pursue claims against AI-using
employers. The claims are valid and legal minds in the field of labor law should be aware of
what may become a common place issue in years rather than decades.
The question of liability is recognizable as one well-litigated and grounded in legal
precedent when AI is stripped of the mystique of science fiction. AI is a tool, and an employer is
liable for harms caused by use of the tool.27 The deciding factor between what kind of
discrimination, whether it be disparate impact or disparate treatment, is whether the employer
was aware of the AI’s discriminating tendencies. To fully understand this application of law, it is
crucial that a basic understanding of AI is accompanied by knowledge of the twin theories of
disparate impact and treatment. This provides guidance as to employment liability and reveals
the practical limitations of the law as it stands regarding evidentiary requirements and burdens on
potential plaintiffs.
I.
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Artificial Intelligence in a Nutshell

Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 524-526 (2018).
Id. at 553.
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Before an analysis of the law in question and how AI fits into the current employment
law scheme, it should be explained what exactly constitutes an AI and how they work. A simple
explanation is that AI are computers that learn. 28 This sets out a very broad category often
disappointing to those who grew up on Star Trek. “Simple” computers such as calculators and
home computers fail to classify as AI, while a phone’s predictive text does. 29 There are two kinds
of AI; narrow or “weak” AI and general or “strong” AI. 30 These definitions come from an AI’s
ability to learn, machine learning and deep learning.31 Regardless of the type of AI or the way it
learns, all AI are subject to biases and this is the foundation for many of the legal implications
arising from AI.32 A subtle yet compounding complication to understanding AI comes from the
difficulty in understanding a particular AI and cracking the black box. 33
a. Weak and Strong AI
There are two broad categories which are used to classify AI: narrow AI and Artificial
General Intelligence (AGI). Narrow AI, sometimes referred to as “weak AI” are designed and
developed for a narrow scope of purpose.34 While they excel at those limited tasks, a narrow AI
designed to alert Westlaw users of a personally relevant opinion recently published would be
unable to screen their emails for virus-laden links. AGI, or strong AI, are those that can apply
intelligence to any problem at hand.35 The subject of many a novel and movie, these AI are being
developed and will have an enormous impact in almost every legal field. This is a future some
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time away as strong AI of this caliber are rarely seen outside research labs, and narrow AI
dominate the market.36 The immediate issues are those posed by the narrow AI widely available
on the market now and still being developed and improved.
b. Machine Learning and Deep Learning
Most AI are like those that LinkedIn uses; a program that takes data and establishes
patterns from it to modify future actions. These AI do this through algorithms and a process
known as machine learning.37 An algorithm is a process or set of rules to be followed for
problem-solving applications.38 Although the term is shrouded in scientific clout, an algorithm is
something legal minds are trained for. Legal professionals form sets of rules from case
precedent, administrative regulations, and statutory law, and then apply sets of facts to them to
create legal outcomes. AI do much the same with coded programming and gathered data.
Machine learning is the term for computers learning through algorithms. 39 When a
computer encounters a problem, it extracts patterns from data. 40 The AI then uses those patterns
to associate outcomes with certain features that can then be applied to new situations. 41 This
allows the AI to take information and patterns from one problem and on to the next, that new
knowledge making it better equipped to deal with future problems. 42 Deep learning is considered
a subfield or evolution of machine learning and is more complicated. 43 Replicating the neural
network of a brain, the AI has a “thought process” that goes through neural networks of decision
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making.44 The technical aspect behind this is fascinating, but largely irrelevant from a legal
perspective and it will suffice to say that deep learning enables more sophisticated and powerful
AI.45
c. Algorithmic Bias
No matter the kind of learning an AI utilizes or their purpose, an AI learns. An AI’s
programming allows it to learn, and as with anything taught, it is susceptible to bias. 46
Algorithm bias is the term for a systemic pattern of errors creating unfair or undesired
outcomes.47 This bias can occur on either level; the machine’s own learning can create and
develop biases, or the program can inherit biases from its developer. 48
An AI can find patterns without accounting for the cause of them and draw an incorrect
correlation. Relating back to Amazon, that AI determined a successful tech employee was male
by finding a pattern that most successful employees were male. It did not consider the underlying
issues of gender breakdowns in tech, 49 and that only about 25% of computing roles are held by
women.50 Underrepresentation of women in STEM fields is a well-known issue and although
many employers are actively seeking to remedy such issues, computers are unaware of cultural
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problems experienced by humans. While some critics claim this social blindness is one of the
greatest virtues of a computer, this creates a perpetuating bias. 51
When a computer mistakenly finds a correlation and develops a rule based on the pattern
it has discovered, it applies that rule towards the next problem and set of data. 52 Since this
underlying rule is wrong, the next pattern it finds and next rule it creates is based on faulty logic
and is more likely than not to also be wrong. 53 This chain eventually ends in a program that is
entirely mistaken, and all results from a single bias. 54
The other source of bias in AI are the biases of the developer. A prime example is facial
recognition software. Facial recognition technology is a rapidly expanding market, from
governments that seek to increase security through identification databases to retail chains that
seek to create stores without any employees. 55 Facial recognition software suffers from bias; the
three leading facial recognition AI have a 30% higher error rate when identifying darker skinned
people.56 Developers determined that the primary causes for these errors came not from the AI’s
learning, but from the system development itself.57 Development teams were primarily white
men, and the facial feature points the program focused on were based on those distinguishable in
white men.58
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The AI was created from by a team with specific perspective that led to overlooking
important distinguishing features. The own-race bias (ORB) is a phenomenon that has been the
subject of intensive psychological study for decades. 59 The two prominent theories explaining
this phenomenon are the exposure theory and the contact theory. 60 The former theory is that
exposure at a young age to one’s own race shapes the facial recognition function of the brain,
and the latter theory that since a person is more likely to come into contact with members of their
own race more often and thus have a larger mental database to draw patterns across. 61 Under
either theory though, this phenomenon is inherited by the developed AI and it logically follows
that any bias held by the developer is likely to occur in the AI. 62
d. The Black Box
One final matter to mind is the accessibility of AI and AI generated data. Many think that
because an AI relies on written code, its mind can be read by looking into its inner workings.
Unfortunately AI code reads more like tea leaves than literature, and the inner workings are often
called “black boxes” due to their virtually impenetrable nature. 63 Black boxes are volumes of
information obscured in part due to the secretive nature of developers, and in part because of the
nature of the data itself.64 Developers guard the details of their AI’s inner workings to prevent
piracy and plagiarism.65 This secrecy compounds the already befuddling nature of AI, as they are
so complicated, technical, and overwhelming by the sheer quantity of information and composite

59

Hoo Keat Wong, Ian Stephen, David Keeble, The Own-Race Bias for Race Recognition in a Multiracial Society,
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY (Mar. 6th, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00208/full.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See generally Najibi, supra at note 50.
63
ITechLaw, supra at note 24, at 105.
64
Id.
65
Id.

code.66 This black box within a black box permeates any legal issue in which AI is involved and
will quickly become an evidentiary quagmire for litigators across the legal landscape.
II.

Relevant Current Law for Analysis

Although it has been around two decades since the last major employment bill has made
its way through Congress, employment law has branched and grown in that time. Employment
law has grown more like a briar bush than a beech tree though, and it is easy to become
entangled in the mess. In regard to hiring and recruitment, there are primarily two theories of
employment discrimination.67 The theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact allow
challenges to practices that discriminate against the individual, discrimination being a term of
art.68 Discrimination is defined as “the unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of
people… especially on the grounds of race, age, or sex.” 69 The field of law governing
discriminatory hiring practices and promotions is primarily rooted in two Acts; Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)70 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).71
Products liability in some senses is simpler than the relevant employment law because
products liability can be strict liability.72 In other it is more nuanced because it derives from tort
and contractual law, governed by state product liability law rather than federal statute. 73 For the
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purposes of the relevant analysis, the approach the majority of states take towards product
liability specific to software will be discussed.
a. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment is the more obvious of the two discrimination theories, and the most
common.74 Disparate treatment “is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”75 In lay terms, disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. Disparate
treatment is proven in one of two ways; demonstrating a formal policy of prohibited
discrimination, or by proving a pattern of employment decisions that circumstantially prove a
practice of discrimination.76
Employers rarely have formal policies of illegal discrimination though, and plaintiffs
generally have to establish a pattern of employment decisions to prove a practice of
discrimination.77 The common structure for proving this is established by McDonnell Douglas
and holds that a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer
discriminated.78 When a formal policy of discrimination exists, the plaintiff has the burden to
prove a prima facie case.79 A plaintiff is required to 1) prove she belongs to a protected class, 2)
that she applied and was qualified for a vacant position, 3) despite her qualifications, she was
rejected, and 4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
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Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to
Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 103 (2009).
75
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people with the plaintiff’s qualifications. 80 From there the burden shifts to the employer to put
into evidence a nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory decision. 81 This shifts
the burden of proof back to the plaintiff, who must then show that the proffered reason was
simply a pretext.82 Proving pretext offers numerous evidentiary problems and few cases survive
pleadings, let alone summary judgment.83
b. Disparate Impact
Policies that are nondiscriminatory on their face but have a disproportionately negative
effect on members of legally protected groups are considered to have a disparate impact. 84
Because these policies are facially neutral, disparate impact has no intent requirement and looks
at the protected class as a group, contrary to the purely individualized scope of disparate
treatment.85 Tests with little to no relation to an employee’s performance, 86 arbitrary
requirements as to height, weight87, and even more subjective criteria like specific skills 88 can
classify as policies with disparate impact.
Disparate impact came to the legal centerstage in Griggs, a Supreme Court case holding
that Title VII prohibited facially neutral employment policies resulting in discrimination on the
basis of a protected trait. 89 To make a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must prove
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that 1) she is a part of a protected class, 2) the employer has implemented a practice that
produces an adverse effect to protected individuals, 3) because of status as part of the protected
class.90 To prove the third element of causation, the plaintiff will use either the statistical
significance test or the four-fifths rule. 91 Statistical significance tests requires a plaintiff to prove
a specified level that the observed disparity is not due to random chance, the level usually being
ninety-five percent.92 The four-fifths test requires a plaintiff prove a group’s pass rate is fourfifths less than another group.93
The evidentiary hurdles of disparate impact claims stem from convincing a court of one’s
preferred statistical correlation. Disparate impact claims do not follow structures like McDonnell
Douglas, and instead rely heavily on statistics, allowing comparisons such as a protected class’s
representation in a certain employer’s practice and that class’s representation in the local labor
market.94 The current trend across Circuit courts follows the Second Circuit in holding that the
existence of a disparity amongst a general population does not necessarily correlate to the pool of
applicants qualified for the jobs in question.95 Beyond that, the subject of many arguments in
disparate impact claims comes down to which statistics the court should use, and how.
c. Title VII and the ADEA
Title VII gives protection to individual employees from discrimination based on; “race,
color, religion, sex96, or national origin.97” Protected activities include failure or refusal to “hire
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or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,…” or “to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees… in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee….” 98 Title
VII’s recognition of disparate impact claims is written into the Act itself, requiring a plaintiff to
prove a “particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact… and the respondent
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.”99 Case law provides for Title VII claims on disparate
treatment, as noted in McDonnel Douglas.100
The other Act which protects employees and applicants is the ADEA, though it does so
only for those over the age of 40.101 The ADEA uses near identical language in its prohibition of
employer actions.
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age;
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual’s age…102
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To some extent, the ADEA offers less protection due to the nature of the protected class.
Age is often accompanied by physical change and traits that may be job relevant. This makes it
more likely there exists a legitimate reason for discrimination relating to business necessity, or at
least easier for employers to establish a believable pretext. Despite this practical limitation,
courts analyze ADEA claims near the same way they analyze Title VII claims, reading Title VII
interpretation into the ADEA.103 Claims of disparate impact and treatment for ADEA cases are
equally viable and follow the same structure and evidentiary requirements as those under Title
VII, and can effectively be treated as the same body of law for the purposes of AI in hiring. 104
While both disparate impact and disparate treatment are recognized under both applicable
bases of employment law, the two claims will rarely apply to the same set of facts. The core of
disparate impact is that the policy or action challenged is facially neutral. Employment
discrimination as a field of law is focused on the individual and as-applied cases, and disparate
treatment is the epitome of this. To prove a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must prove that
they were discriminated against because of their protected status. Disparate impact is less
focused, as it challenges a policy which will disproportionately affect a specific class. While the
discrimination case will be focused on the individual bringing suit, the case will focus on a
policy that affects an entire class. While it is important to keep the differences in mind since the
practical differences of the two theories render a bright line between the two, AI manages to blur
that line.
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In relation to awarding privileges and benefits to employees in a discriminatory manner, the Supreme Court held
that “this interpretation of Title VII… applies with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the
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applied broadly to most aspects of discrimination in the ADEA.
104
Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 18 (9th
ed.2020).

d. Products Liability
Products-liability is a claim derived from contract and tort law that a party can hold
manufacturers, processors, distributors, and sellers of products liable for personal injury or
property damage allegedly resulting from use.105 A products liability claim may be brought under
several theories, including strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence. 106 A plaintiff can
bring a products liability claim under a theory of strict liability when a product; 1) contains a
manufacturing defect even when a product is used with all possible care, 2) is defective in design
when the foreseeable risks of harm could have been reduced or avoided by adoption of a
reasonable alternative design, or 3) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the provision of such.107
To prove a defective design under strict liability, a plaintiff must prove; 1) the seller was
engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the harm, 2) the product was defective
when sold, 3) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, 4) the product
was received by the consumer in substantially the same condition as produced, and 5) the
plaintiff’s damages were a direct and proximate cause of the defect. 108 There is a split amongst
jurisdictions as to whether there is a difference between negligence and strict liability in design
defect cases.109
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For our purposes, there is no meaningful difference between the two tort theories because
any harm caused would be purely economic and exist under the contractual portion of products
liability.110 Under contract law, a party can contract a manufacturer, designer, or distributor of a
product to indemnify and hold them harmless in case of liability in a civil suit. 111 Specifically to
software, neither state legislatures nor courts have been unified in their application of product
liability to software.112 Although there is growing pressure for legislative action in this regard
due to the inadequacy of current law, there is a growing trend in application of products liability
to software.113 For the purposes of analyzing AI-based claims under Title VII and the ADEA,
there will be an assumption that a court embraces this trend.
III.

Liability and AI in Employment

Recruitment AI can be designed in an incomprehensible variety of designs, but in the
end, they will share certain aspects as they aim to achieve the same goal. AI used in employment
will be used as tools to streamline the two most tedious aspects of hiring, reaching applicants and
filtering applicants. At either step an AI may discriminate against prospective employees, and it
is conceded that discrimination in the solicitation of applicants is less protected than denying
applicants.114 That is not to say that it is not protected though, as a case predicated on that issue
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may soon come the Northern District of California, after having been dismissed with leave to
amend.115
For the purposes of an employer’s liability in a disparate treatment case, the steps will be
analyzed using Amazon’s AI as a fact pattern. The assumption will be that Amazon discovered
the AI had developed a bias against women and used it for recruitment purposes anyway. Then a
single fact will change; Amazon never discovered the algorithmic bias. This would turn the case
into one of disparate impact, where intent is irrelevant. The disparate impact case will follow
through into an analysis of whether or not the developer of the AI could be liable. Finally,
Bradley will be examined as an example of a disparate treatment case where the employer
intentionally set the program to discriminate and how the case’s deficits can be remedied.
a. Disparate Treatment and Artificial Intelligence
Beginning the hypothetical recruitment process, Amazon’s AI reaches out across the
digital landscape and informs individuals about openings in their tech department. In doing so, it
targets men specifically because it has decided women make inferior employees. The AI
searches through LinkedIn pages for prospective employees with certain qualifications, 116
compiling a list of the men who meet them, and then sending them emails inviting them to apply
for a position. Step one of the AI’s function is complete, it has reached out to potential applicants
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and specifically denied communicating vacancies to women. This creates the first cause of
action; denial of opportunity to compete.
Although it seems obvious that this would be employment discrimination, bearing great
resemblance to signs in the early 1900’s saying, “No Irish Need Apply,” this is perhaps the most
difficult hurdle to jump. Technically Amazon has taken no action against these women, rather
the claim would be based on inaction. Although Title VII and the ADEA both extend to
applicants,117 neither addresses solicitation of applicants. This is a unique problem of the AI age,
where someone can mass-broadcast a message while targeting the audience at the same time.
Before the era of the household computer, jobs were advertised in windows, newspapers, and
magazines and an employer could not filter who received notice. This modern problem is
unlikely to see federal legislation in the next few years and such claims will rely on judicial
interpretation of right of opportunity.
In a jurisdiction with a narrow reading of the statute and standing, a claim based on
discrimination in the solicitation of applications would not be actionable. In the Circuits that treat
standing broadly, a plaintiff could sustain a claim they were discriminated against unlawfully by
showing that they were denied an opportunity they were ready and able to act upon. 118 The
plaintiff would be able to form a prima facie case by proving 1) she belongs to a protected class,
2) that she was able and ready to apply for the position, 3) despite her qualifications, she was
denied, and 4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
people with the plaintiff’s qualifications. McDonald Douglas should apply in this situation
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despite the plaintiff never being rejected for the position, creating a further framework for
litigation. The solicitation of an application and the communication of a vacancy are both parts
of the hiring process, as learning of a vacancy is the first step in any application process.
Under McDonald Douglas, successfully presenting a prima facie case would shift the
burden of proof to Amazon and require them to prove a nondiscriminatory reason for their
decision. Should Amazon manage to prove that their AI which specifically filters out women is
not discriminating on the basis of sex, the burden of proof would shift back to the plaintiff to
prove it a pretext. This step of McDonald Douglas would prove a challenging hurdle given that
the AI itself admits through its coding a discriminatory intent. AI discrimination in the
solicitation phase creates a legal action against employers, and the tool to make recruitment
easier becomes the instrument of the employer’s demise.
After soliciting applications from these candidates, the AI further filters out the chaff. For
the sake of simplicity, we will assume the AI only has an algorithmic bias against women and
seeks to further eliminate any that may have made it through the net. This analysis is
straightforward and avoids the standing pitfall of discrimination in the solicitation phase. The
prima facie case plays out like a law school hypothetical; 1) the plaintiff proves she is a part of a
protected class, 2) she applied and was qualified for a vacant position, 3) despite her
qualifications, she was rejected, and 4) the position remained open, and the employer continued
to seek applicants from people with the plaintiff’s qualifications. The McDonald Douglas
framework works as designed and follows the same steps as it would in the solicitation phase
without needing to adapt it for seeking applicants.
The key to proving a disparate treatment case is proving the intent. When humans are the
employers and hiring officers, the evidence of discriminatory motive and intent is often difficult

to prove. Few are so kind to prospective plaintiffs as to write out every thought they have
regarding applicants and their reasons for choosing one over another. As will be discussed in a
later section, it is unlikely AI will be so kind either. Under existing legal framework, plaintiffs
can make a case of disparate treatment at the hands of AI, and their employers are liable by
knowingly using a system that intentionally discriminates based on a protected class.
b. Disparate Impact and Artificial Intelligence
In the circumstance that Amazon never discovered the AI’s bias, plaintiffs would bring a
suit under disparate impact rather than disparate treatment. In the AI’s initial action, the first step
of establishing standing will vex any potential plaintiff. A disparate impact claim has a unique
advantage in this regard over disparate treatment, however. Disparate impact looks not at a
specific instance or individual as does disparate treatment, but rather at the employer’s practice.
If the practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, then the practice violates Title VII.
Separate hiring channels serve as evidence of a disparate policy. 119 Further, there is no mention
of a “complaining party” needing to be an employee or applicant. 120 As previously mentioned,
notice of a vacancy is the first step in the application process and deliberately withholding and a
system that deliberately withholds information from a protected class of individuals will violate
this provision of Title VII.
The facts fit the model for a disparate impact claim perfectly; the employer’s facially
neutral system produces an adverse employment action against individuals based on being a part
of a protected class. If the AI’s inner workings can be deciphered during discovery and proof of
the AI’s self-developed bias against protected classes discovered, then the case seems an easy
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win for plaintiffs. An issue to be tackled later, it is best to assume that the inner workings of an
AI would not be available during discovery and plaintiffs are required to prove disparate impact
more conventionally.
Although the details and numbers of each case are unique to themselves, it is fair to
assume that the AI would prove effective at its job. An AI would commit itself to filtering out all
women from the application process, by failing to communicate vacancies to them and then
removing any remaining female applicants from the resume pool. The AI’s success would be an
employer’s failure, as plaintiffs would likely be able to show staggering disparity in the applicant
and hiring pool. An AI curated resume pool that filtered out women could deliver to Amazon’s
HR department a list of 300 applicants ready to hire, all of them men. A plaintiff offering an
applicant pool zero-percent female makes a compelling case of systemic disparate impact.
In terms of disparate impact cases, AI may prove too effective for their own good.
Employers will want to be mindful of AI they utilize and monitor them closely for any rogue
behavior. The lack of an intent requirement means even a good faith employer can find
themselves liable under disparate impact. Worse yet, if they do discover a flaw in their system
and continue to utilize the AI anyway, they establish a case of disparate treatment. Under the
McDonald Douglas framework, a plaintiff could shift the burden of proof to the employer, and
they would find it difficult to shift it back when their own tools paint them red-handed.
c. Liabilities of Parties Under Disparate Impact
If an AI develops its own algorithm to discriminate against suspect classes, an employer
may be able to seek indemnification from the developer under a theory of product liability.
Before establishing a claim of strict liability, the employer would need to prove that the AI is not

being misused or abused, or rather that the use was a reasonable one. 121 To establish a claim
under strict liability, the employer would need to prove 1) the seller was engaged in the business
of selling the product that caused the harm, 2) the product was defective when sold, 3) the
product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, 4) the product was received by the
consumer in substantially the same condition as produced, and 5) the plaintiff’s damages were a
direct and proximate cause of the defect. 122
Although possible that an employer might find and repurpose an AI with a different
purpose and use it for recruitment, it is more likely that an AI contracted for would be designed
for the employer’s purpose. Both parties in any potential litigation will spend a great deal of time
in their briefs addressing this as it ties in with the second element. It is a fair disagreement
whether an employer is be solely responsible for the AI’s error, depending on how the AI is
trained to accomplish its goal. If the employer is responsible for training the AI on desired
qualities, the same way Amazon trained its AI on current employees, then the issue may not be a
defect in design. Even then though, a sympathetic jury may find that the developer should have
safeguards in place to protect against self-taught discrimination.
Assuming the facts of the hypothetical case allow a permissible argument, the employer
would proceed to establish their case. The first element is often easily satisfied, as the employer
need only prove the seller of the software, or the developer, is responsible for distribution or
development of the product. The second element is tied to the previously discussed step of
whether the AI was reasonably used. If the employer’s actions were not the cause, or did not
unreasonably cause the AI’s discriminatory pattern, then the AI was defective when sold. The
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third element is perhaps the most difficult to prove as it requires the employer prove the product
was unreasonably dangerous to use. This element generally pertains to physical harm and is why
purely economic losses are pursued under contract law rather than tort. 123 This analysis is still the
most appropriate to use since the underlying cause of action, stemming from the act of
discrimination in hiring is a tort.124
The difficulty in addressing this element comes from the novel nature of AI in law. It is
difficult to tell what a reasonable AI is, let alone how it should identify prospective employees or
how to rank them. It is easy to wander astray when exploring the legal wilderness of novel
claims, so this article shall leave the details of this topic to others. Suffice to say that this would
be one of the major turning points in a defective design case regarding discriminating AI. The
fourth element is another issue of complex and novel issue. The standard of substantially does
not apply well to AI, whose very purpose is to change and adapt. The proper analysis for AI in a
defective design analysis would take this into account and seek to establish that the core
processes and functions of the AI had not changed. This equates to modification outside of
developer software updates and minor adaption to an employer’s current system. The final
element is if the employer’s damages were the direct and proximate cause of the defect. An
employer could prove this by showing that but-for the alleged defect of the AI, learning
discriminatory practices based on protected classes, the employer never would have engaged in
discriminatory practices by proxy and never have been sued.
In an ironic twist, a developer could rebut this element by claiming that the employer had
a facially neutral yet discriminatory policy in place beforehand and the AI learned from this
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violating practice. Many of these possible proofs an employer might make against a developer
are rebuttable by both typical product liability defenses and even the claims of the original
plaintiff bringing the employment discrimination claim themselves. A wary employer would be
wise to contract for indemnification when licensing, purchasing, or paying for the development
of an AI to avoid any more litigation outside well-defined law than is necessary. This rough
adaptation of product liability in response to an adaptation of employment discrimination law to
AI-based causes of action, which one could argue is a further and rougher adaptation of agency
law, shows the need for legislative action. Employment is not alone in anticipating dramatic
changes resulting from AI, and courts are poorly outfit for adapting to technical and alien causes
of action. AI based causes of action are best described as alien, as they challenge many
fundamental understandings of the law in these instances, and legislation is the best remedy.
d. Bradley’s Folly
A cynical reader will not be swayed by a hypothetical situation based on an AI that was
scrapped early in its life. It has already been conceded that a case, Bradley, confronts some of
these novel AI issues has already found its way to court and has been dismissed for lack of
standing. There are two issues that make Bradley a troublesome case, standing and jurisdiction.
These two issues are likely to surface in any claim derived from internet actions and are like
many legal problems deriving from online causes of action. 125 These problems require creative
application of existing law written before the internet changed the world. Bradley is no different.
Bradley is a class action, represented by four plaintiffs and the Communications Works
of America (CWA) on behalf of older workers discriminated against by T-Mobile and Amazon
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in employment advertising and recruitment.126 The defendants used Facebook to advertise
vacancies to the public and used Facebook’s customizable algorithms to only show the
advertisement to individuals between the ages of 18 and 38. 127 T-Mobile and Amazon defend
themselves by claiming that the plaintiffs had no desire to actually apply for the advertised job,
and the age-targeting did not hinder their ability to compete for employment. 128 The court
dismissed the claim with leave to amend due to lack of standing and personal jurisdiction. 129 The
court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege that they personally
were denied an opportunity to apply for jobs.130 The deficit of personal jurisdiction stems from
the targeted advertisement lacking any geography; the online nature of the advertisement fails to
establish any minimum contacts.131
Bradley’s standing issue is unique because none of the plaintiffs applied for the positions
advertised.132 Although all were able and ready to apply, none had actually taken the step to do
so. Although some courts have indicated they are open to such a low bar for standing, the
precedential Supreme Court cases of Northeastern133 and Adarand134 that lay out the right of
opportunity to compete are opportunities for contracts. The plaintiffs in those cases operated
business that routinely sought out and performed contracts, and this routine practice created an
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inference that if the plaintiffs were ready and able to accept the contract, they would do so. 135 It
is typical that an individual will only seek out a job best fitting to them and regard more factors
than a contractor might in pursuing a government contract. To properly apply this ready and able
requirement to employment, a plaintiff must show an inclination towards that job. 136
There are two remedies to this issue of standing; the first is to plausibly allege that the
plaintiff was actively seeking employment and applied for positions similar to the one the
employer offered, and the second is to apply for the position challenged. The first remedy creates
a stronger and more plausible foundation for a claim of a particularized and actual injury, since
the standing requirement of a case under Article III requires such. An individual cannot bring a
claim on behalf of an entire protected class and must plausibly allege that they were personally
injured by the denial of information. By showing that the individual plaintiff would have applied
for the position, beyond a mere statement in a legal complaint, would likely be sufficient to most
courts to at least survive the pleading phase.
The second solution may seem to avoid a fight on advertising entirely and double down
on employment practices. To an extent, this is true. As previously discussed, the law grows
slower than technology. There is certainly an argument to be made that the discrimination in
advertising is actionable. Many would shudder at the thought that an employer could stand at the
corner and hand out fliers soliciting employment applications, but only to white men under the
age of 40. The function of the AI is little different than that, but most courts are not prepared to
dive into the digital world and unknown field of AI.
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The second issue is jurisdiction, a topic which haunts lawyers from their first days of law
school. Establishing jurisdiction is a Herculean task in a digital era, but it is compounded in
Bradley. Three plaintiffs of the four in Bradley are from outside the Northern District of
California, with only Richard Haynie and the CWA residing in California. Further, the
advertising campaign created by Amazon and T-Mobile and conducted by Facebook was
international and lacked any specific geographic target. Here the deficit of Bradley comes from
its nature as a class action. The claim is brought under the ADEA, a federal law, and establishes
subject matter jurisdiction. A federal court would have personal jurisdiction in the state of
Washington,137 and suit could appropriately be brought there.138 Likely for reasons of fiscal
practicality, Bradley was brought in California because of the Northern District’s favorable
precedent and courts and because that is where the CWA resides, and one of the largest
communications and media labor union in the US likely funded the plaintiff’s action. 139 Were the
plaintiffs to bring suit in the Western District Court of Washington, they would avoid this
jurisdictional issue.
IV.

Problems of Proving Liability

Suppose the plaintiffs in Bradley remedy their deficits and a prospective plaintiff in the
hypothetical Amazon case could establish their prima facie case. The complaint is filed, and an
obligatory motion to dismiss is survived. Next comes summary judgment, which ends near
seventy-seven percent of employment discrimination cases. 140 Theories as to why so many cases
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end at summary judgment vary from optimism that discrimination is on the decline, to the
cynical belief that federal judges are hostile to employees bringing discrimination, and in the
middle a pragmatic view that meritorious claims get settled. 141 All agree on one issue though;
proving intent is hard.142
As previously mentioned, disparate treatment cases are the most common form of
discrimination claim. Intent is a requirement of the complaint, and since open statements
revealing unlawful discrimination are remarkably rare plaintiffs must prove intent
circumstantially. Disparate impact claims fare little better despite not needing intent. Disparate
impact requires proof that a system as a whole has a discriminatory effect, which is labor
intensive in the best of times and often inconclusive. AI has the potential of flipping everything
on its head. When an employer discriminates against an applicant, they often do their best to hide
their shameful secret. A computer engraves its principle and puts it on the wall so that it never
forgets. The grand question of this new frontier is how to find it.
a. Traditional Evidentiary Issues in Discrimination Cases
Although disparate treatment cases seek to prove intent and disparate impact cases seek
to prove effect, they both find themselves climbing the same evidentiary mountains. The most
glaring roadblock comes in the form of defining direct and circumstantial evidence. 143
Circumstantial evidence uses its common definition of evidence that supports drawing an
inference of disputed fact, while direct evidence has only had definitions rejected by the
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Supreme Court in an employment setting.144 This is relevant to the burden-shifting frame work
of McDonald Douglas and other burden-shifting schemes. 145 The nature of summary judgment
exacerbates these issues since the nature of an employment discrimination claim is heavily
contextual. Even though summary judgment views evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party it inherently leads to the view of evidence in isolation and denies the
cumulative and contextual weight of circumstantial evidence. 146
Unique to disparate treatment cases is the proving of intent, a difficult and fickle thing to
pin down. The appeal of the McDonald Douglas framework is that making the prima facie case
creates a presumption of discrimination, and therefore intent. This proves to be poor medicine for
the evidentiary ill since the employer then provides a non-discriminatory reason, shifting the
burden back to the plaintiff to prove the reason was a pretext. The plaintiff finds themselves
holding the burden to prove pretext, and thus, intent with no further means to shift the burden.
This burden often proves too much for plaintiffs since there is little Supreme Court guidance as
to how much evidence is sufficient to create a reasonable question for the jury, and lower courts
follow a cascading buildup of precedent supporting a high bar. 147 As a matter of practice, this
leads to judges often playing the role not as a gatekeeper of litigation but a single predisposed
juror.
Disparate impact claims may not need to prove intent, but their own issues make up for
this. The most obvious is the difficulty in making a prima facie case. While on paper the
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elements of a prima facie impact case seem lenient, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is
“responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities.” 148 From there, the plaintiff must prove a
correlation between the employment practices and the adverse effect and beat any defense an
employer may raise about business relatedness of the practice and requirements. 149 Added to this
comes the difficulty of obtaining statistical evidence of the employer’s practice and the relevant
labor market.150
b. Unique Evidentiary Issues in AI
AI has the potential to create entirely new frameworks for proving discrimination,
because even in a disparate impact claim the AI would likely produce direct evidence of
discrimination. An AI recruitment program is essentially a human resources agent that writes
everything thought as a note, and meticulously writes out how it reaches a decision. Obtaining
these notes hidden in the AI’s code and logs would be incontrovertible evidence of
discrimination. The lines of code that reveal a discriminatory intent are a philosopher’s stone; a
mythical object that can turn the weakest case into solid gold. Unfortunately, the AI writes these
notes for its own purpose, not for a potential plaintiff and those meticulous notes read out as a
never-ending sentence with far too many parentheses and not enough words.
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Before an eager plaintiff begins their quest for the legend, they will have to pass through
the gates of discovery. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline the scope of discovery, 151
and case law fleshes out the rules. The recurring theme of AI in law is prevalent here as well, as
the nature of AI proves difficult to fit within existing legal framework. AI are more often
protected by secrecy than copyright law since copyright law does not adequately extend to AI
and self-generated code.152 Due to the importance of secrecy in AI development, employers and
developers alike will fight tooth and nail to prevent any discovery into the code of an AI.
Although Supreme Court precedent provides an edge for plaintiffs, 153 the actual practice of
granting discovery requests and what can and cannot be discovered is “within the sound
discretion of the trial court…”154 How courts will treat discovery requests peering into the inner
machinations of a program that has grown past the original programming of the developer is an
educated guess every time a motion for discovery is made. The policy and legal arguments for
strict discovery rules versus favorable treatment towards plaintiffs go both ways and are likely to
result in cases within cases at the discovery stage.
Assuming a favorable outcome in a discovery request, attorneys and plaintiffs looking for
gold in code had best be wary. The complicated and technical nature of AI could mean they
spend immense resources and efforts looking for gold only to end up empty handed. Where
traditional discrimination claims leave plaintiffs grasping for evidentiary straws, AI threatens to
give plaintiffs too much. The very expectation of direct evidence may even make the traditional
summary judgment wall impassable. Courts may expect that if an AI discriminates, there will be
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clear and direct evidence in the code. Should a plaintiff fail to find it, courts and jurors alike may
assume that to mean there is no discrimination. Plaintiffs may very well ask themselves if the
search is worth the costs and the risk, choosing instead to establish AI discrimination through
traditional means.
V.

Conclusion

Our legal system operates much like an AI does. The federal and state constitutions are
the original code that create our program. Legal minds encounter problems and write new rules
to better equip themselves with future problems and learn from the experiences. The strength of
our system comes from its adaptability. Much like an AI, we have encountered a new problem in
the world of employment law. The algorithms, the laws, that currently exist for this problem are
Title VII, the ADEA, and existing case law. Applying these laws to the new facts of AI
discriminating against individuals generates an outcome familiar to our system. If an employer’s
facially neutral system has a disparate impact on a protected class, it is actionable under the law.
If an employer intentionally discriminates against an individual due to their status as a protected
class and it results in disparate treatment, it is actionable under the law.
AI is a powerful tool that is changing the world and revolutionizing the digital era, but it
is a tool, nonetheless. AI should be treated as such in accordance with existing law to reach the
desired and just outcome of protecting those within the scope of Title VII and the ADEA, and
users of AI should be aware they are liable for the actions caused by their tools. Likewise, job
applicants and their attorneys should be aware that although AI will change the legal landscape,
many familiar obstacles will remain. Proving claims will remain an uphill battle, and McDonald
Douglas will still appear in more briefs than it will not. No AI, not IBM’s Watson nor HAL
9000, is powerful enough to change McDonald Douglas.

